The first option, disabling AJP, is the most secure and robust recommended solution. Use only network binding and firewall configuration to ensure incoming connections are only allowed from trusted hosts.Protect the AJP connection with a secret, as well as carefully reviewing network binding and firewall configuration to ensure incoming connections are only allowed from trusted hosts.HTTP and HTTPS do not contain the same trust issues as AJP. Disable AJP altogether in Tomcat, and instead use HTTP or HTTPS for incoming proxy connections.In order of preference, one of the following mitigations should be applied: The preventive measures should be taken by using the configuration that will not allow AJP to be exposed. It is insecure (clear text transmission) and assumes that your network is safe. AJP is a highly trusted protocol and should never be exposed to untrusted clients. This is a configuration issue with AJP protocol in Tomcat/Undertow.
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In instances where a poorly configured server allows file uploads, an attacker could upload malicious JavaServer Pages (JSP) code within a variety of file types to gain remote code execution (RCE).ĬVE-2020-1745 is a file read/inclusion using the AJP connector in Undertow and very similar to CVE-2020-1938. A remote, unauthenticated/untrusted attacker could exploit this AJP configuration to read web application files from a server exposing the AJP port to untrusted clients. The AJP protocol is enabled by default, with the AJP connector listening in TCP port 8009 and bond to IP address 0.0.0.0. 8.x (as pki-servlet-container, pki-servlet-engine in pki-deps module)ĬVE-2020-1938 is a file read/inclusion using the AJP connector in Apache Tomcat.Red Hat JBoss Enterprise Application Platform (EAP).
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